What a difference two months makes. When Melbourne City played host to Adelaide United in round 19, coach John Van ‘t Schip crafted one of the tactical tweaks of the season – a reactive 5-2-2-1 that nullified several of the key strengths of Adelaide’s attacking system.
Unfortunately, as we’ve known since the opening rounds of the season, Gombau has drilled his chargers brilliantly in two formations – a Plan A for most occasions, and a Plan B for chasing games when behind or aggressively hunting a result from the opening whistle.
And while in their previous encounter Van’ t Schip proved full of ideas to tackle the 4-3-3 (Plan A), here was a startling demonstration that despite plenty of pre-warning, he and his Melbourne City side simply failed to account for the fluidity and movement of Gombau’s more adventurous tactical system.
In round two, this column sketched some of the basic outlines of Adelaides 3-4-3 (Plan B) – the dual role of the No6 in moving between defence and attack, and the lopsided back three offering an attacking role to the increasingly impressive Tarek Elrich.
Here though, what was even more intriguing was the subtle modulation of this system, specifically the freedom afforded Sergio Cirio, and the fact that Adelaide comfortably dismantled City without dual lynchpins to their style of play – Marcelo Carrusca and Isaias.
Inside the opening minutes of this game something occurred that would have first-year coaches spraying instructions from the touchline. The ball crosses the left touchline around halfway – who takes the throw in, obviously the left-back, no? Instead diminutive ball player Cirio ran over. Elrich made no attempt to hustle him upfield, nor did any of Gombau’s assistants chastise him.
On several occasions as the half progressed (such as in the 31st minute), with Osama Malik tasked with playing the ‘Isaias role’ (pushing into midfield in attack, dropping to centre-back in defence), it instead was Cirio who dropped back to perform this function; casually exchanging passes with Dylan McGowan or Eugene Galekovic in moments of reduced tempo and recycled possession.
What both these examples demonstrate is a conscious ploy by Adelaide and Gombau to remove Cirio from dangerous areas of the pitch, allowing Adelaide’s best attacking weapon to not only flee the attention of markers, but also to remove himself from the build-up, enabling late phase or even third man runs.
Take Adelaide’s second goal, and whilst average defending plays no small part, it is the movement of Cirio, beginning with him taking a throw in, that leads to a late run that catches City’s central defender Connor Chapman scrambling.
The move initiates in a context of seeming low danger – Cirio has the ball in hand, throwing back 20 metres to McGowan in the mood of recycling possession. The second action is that Elrich then retreats, motioning to Cirio to take up the space he has vacated; the City defenders reposition, Germano comes forward to shadow Cirio, Chapman and the back four shuffle across. Then, seemingly with nothing much happening, Cirio bends a sharp run outside Germano, who frantically and belatedly signals to warn Chapman of the Spaniard’s arrival. An excellent long pass from McGowan finds Cirio, with Chapman scrambling – his shot is deflected into the path of Sanchez whose run from deep isn’t tracked by Aaron Mooy, and the midfielder finishes with aplomb.
Credit to Gombau and his staff for doing their homework, as this sequence relies on two aspects of City’s defensive structure and pressing to succeed; firstly, the lack of pressure on Adelaide’s first pass, and secondly, the flat three in Melbourne’s midfield leaving space out wide.
A thorn in the side of Frank Farina’s Sydney FC was the Del Piero or ‘passenger’ effect – a striker, brilliant in possession, but when defending, detrimental to leading an effective, harrying press.
In Josh Kennedy, City have an excellent aerial threat, but not an agile No9 in the mode of Andy Keogh or Besart Berisha. Sitting deeply, City’s front three of Kennedy, Robbie Koren and Harry Novillo failed to exert sufficient pressure, allowing an easy (albeit, excellently executed) long pass from McGowan. Yes, throughout the game Malik’s movement and positioning between the first two lines of Melbourne’s defence provided an often all-too-easy pass past this front three, but nevertheless their general lack of industry provided very little cover for City’s second bank of three.
With Erik Paartalu pushing up to join Germano and Mooy in a flat three defensively, there existed clear space around or outside this line; factor in Adelaide’s numerical superiority in midfield and Cirio’s licence to roam, and this more often than not occurred down City’s right/United’s left.
At half-time, van ‘t Schip adjusted Melbourne’s defensive structure to address these issues, with City lining up defensively as a 4-1-4-1 in the second half. Paartalu therefore sat deeper in front of his back four, and Koren and Novillo dropped back to plug the gaps in wide areas that Cirio had so successfully exploited in the first half. It was to little effect though, his side were already trailing by three, and the match was effectively over.
For Adelaide, this was another warning shot fired at their finals rivals – more impressive for the fact that players such as Malik and Miguel Palanca more than capably filled the roles of Isaias and Carrusca. Fans will be hoping Gombau hasn’t shown too much of hand though, especially with finals opponents Brisbane Roar having edged their previous two encounters.
For City, this was an abject performance, capping a disappointing run of four games without a win. A return to a 4-4-2 diamond against the Phoenix may once again be in order, as van ‘t Schip struggles to find a system that gets the most out of both Kennedy and Koren with finals survival on the line.
