The police officer who was in charge when 96 Liverpool supporters were killed in a crush at Hillsborough in May 1989 has admitted at the new inquests into the disaster that he made a “serious mistake” in accepting command of the match.

David Duckenfield told the court in Warrington, which was packed with families whose relatives died at the FA Cup semi-final, that he was only promoted to become chief superintendent, and so take command at the game, 15 days before it took place.

In his career since 1960, he had previously policed football matches for only one year at Sheffield United’s Bramall Lane ground in the mid-1970s and a single season at Sheffield Wednesday’s Hillsborough ground, 1979-80.

He agreed with Christina Lambert QC, who was asking questions on behalf of the coroner, Sir John Goldring, that by 15 April 1989, the day of the semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest, he had “no recent experience” of policing at Hillsborough.

Lambert asked: “Would it be fair to say that your direct experience of both planning for football matches and policing football matches was very limited?”

Duckenfield, 70, speaking in a calm, assured voice, replied: “I agree with you, ma’am.”

Asked whether when he was appointed chief superintendent of South Yorkshire police’s F Division he had any anxiety about whether he was sufficiently equipped for the role, Duckenfield replied that he was delighted at the promotion and it was police culture to accept such challenges.

Duckenfield said that the assistant chief constable, Walter Jackson, had assured him that he could rely on experienced officers he was inheriting from Brian Mole, F Division’s previous chief superintendent, an experienced Hillsborough match commander.

In hindsight, however, Duckenfield accepted: “I should have thought about my limited knowledge of the role of a commander in a major event that was an all-ticket sell-out, when I had not been responsible, or in that responsible position, previously.”

Asked what he meant by hindsight, Duckenfield said: “I’m older, hopefully wiser – probably I wasn’t the best man for the job on the day.”

Questioned about preparations for the semi-final, Duckenfield admitted to deficiencies in the police’s plan and a series of other failings. He did not have “deep knowledge” of the ground, he accepted, which would have been “beneficial.”

He spent the time he believed was necessary to familiarise himself with the ground “If there was a failing: well, I apologise,” he said.

With hindsight, he said, he should have appreciated that the approach to the Leppings Lane end of the ground, which was allocated to Liverpool supporters, was a natural geographical bottleneck. The police’s operational order did not include staggering spectators’ approach to prevent that end becoming congested, nor to monitor whether the pens into which the Leppings Lane terrace was divided were full. As the chief superintendent, Duckenfield accepted: “I signed the order, so I must accept responsibility.”

The Home Office green guide to safety at sports grounds required contingency plans, but Duckenfield agreed there was no such plan to deal with congestion outside the ground and there should have been.

He did not realise there were files in his office containing details of Hillsborough events, including debriefs of the 1988 semi-final. Nor could he remember if he read Hillsborough’s safety certificate, so he was not aware that it specified safe capacities for different sections of the ground.

He could not recall if he realised the club had no system for counting safe numbers of people into each individual pen and agreed he should have been aware of that.

Duckenfield did not, he said, recognise the risk of overcrowding created by the pens, then agreed with Lambert that “with hindsight,” that risk was “inherent” in the terrace’s layout.

Asked about the policy to delay a match kick-off from 3pm to allow time for a crowd to enter, Duckenfield said it was restricted to “fog on the motorway,” a serious accident or other exceptional circumstances. “Probably I should have been a little more flexible,” he acknowledged.

He said he was not told of any difficulties at Hillsborough the previous year, of the crush at the 1981 semi-final, nor about the “Freeman tactic” – named after a superintendent – of closing off the tunnel leading to the pens when they were full.

“Prior to the game, every piece of information I received was: the ground is safe, the operational order caters for our needs, the staff are efficient; you have no concerns whatsoever,” Duckenfield said.

He had read the green guide, he said, which made club stewards, not police, responsible for preventing overcrowding, but his mistake was not to realise that, by agreement, the police were in control of that responsibility at Hillsborough.

He recalled that he did meet Mole before the semi-final, but was “adamant” Mole was not helpful, seemed to resent having been moved, and “jealously guarded” his relationship with Sheffield Wednesday. Mole’s ex-wife, Margaret Topley, has previously told the inquests that her then husband, who has since died, offered to assist Duckenfield, but that Duckenfield rejected the offer.

Lambert asked: “Do you think it was a mistake for you to accept the role of match commander, and not seek assistance from others, such as Mr Mole?”

Pressed, Duckenfield replied: “With hindsight, it was a serious mistake.”

Asked to clarify, he said: “It was a mistake, with hindsight, knowing the events that occurred on the day, that I continued in the role.”

The inquests continue.